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7 Abstract Reduction of ﬁscal evasion may be pursued by introducing incentive
8 schemes for tax inspectors. The aim of this paper is to explain the role of such
9 bonuses in an economic environment with corruption, i.e. in a world where entre-
10 preneurs and tax inspectors are open to bribery. In detail, we analyze the role of a
11 public incentive scheme, where the tax inspector’s bargaining strength is endoge-
12 nous with respect to an incentive mechanism: indeed the knowledge that even if an
13 entrepreneur does not agree to pay the bribe, s/he can report tax evasion and be
14 partly rewarded for this, increases the tax inspector’s bargaining strength.
15
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18
19 1 Introduction
20 Tax evasion and ﬁscal corruption have been a general and persistent problem
21 throughout history with serious economic consequences even in countries with
22 developed tax systems. Although there is an extensive literature investigating the
23 origins, effects and extent of evasion and corruption from both theoretical and
24 empirical points of view, interaction between tax evasion and corruption has only
25 been partially explored. It is, in fact, only recently that this relationship has been
26 investigated by the scientiﬁc community. When tax authorities are dealing with the
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27 possibility of corruption, they must consider the possibility of taxpayers who
28 underreport their income, bribing inspectors. It is widely agreed that tax evasion and
29 corruption have several detrimental effects on the economy. The loss of tax
30 revenues can, in fact, imply a reduction in public services; in addition, tax evasion
31 and corruption can seriously harm economic growth (amongst others, Rose-
32 Ackerman 1975, 1978; Shleifer and Vishny 1993) and distort income distribution as
33 individuals and ﬁrms may have different opportunities for evasion (Hindriks et al.
34 1999). Chu (1990) and Bowles (1999) ﬁnd that corruption among tax enforcement
35 agents increases income tax evasion, since the effective penalty is weakened, thus
36 providing a theoretical argument for a positive link between tax evasion and
37 corruption. Chander and Wilde (1992) take into account the possibility of collusion
38 between a tax evader and an ofﬁcial auditor whose dishonesty cost is low. In
39 addition, Chander and Wilde (1992) and Sanyal et al. (2000) show that tax revenues
40 may decline along with the income tax rate if there are corrupt tax ofﬁcials. Besley
41 and McLaren (1993), Hindriks et al. (1999) and Mookherjee and Png (1995) deal
42 with the issue of optimal remuneration of inspectors. Hindriks et al. (1999) consider
43 a model where all the actors are dishonest. They show that distributional effects of
44 evasion and corruption are regressive, as the richest taxpayers have most to gain
45 from evading taxes and are least vulnerable to extortion (as it is harder to credibly
46 over–report their income). Mookherjee and Png (1995) also consider only
47 corruptible agents, although they consider a moral hazard problem, since the
48 inspector has to exert a costly non–observable effort for evasion to be disclosed.
49 This work develops a theoretical model to analyze the effects incentive schemes,
50 whether private (a bribe) or public (a bonus rate), have on tax evasion and ﬁscal
51 corruption. The recent literature has highlighted the effect that these two types of
52 incentives, whether considered individually or jointly, may have on tax evasion.
53 Considering them individually, with regard to the effect that private incentive, i.e.
54 the bribe, can have on the evasion, as Mookherjee (1997) stressed, the opportunity
55 to negotiate a bribe with the evading taxpayer, pushes the tax inspector to do more
56 checks in order to detect evasion. The tax payers anticipate that there is higher
57 probability of being inspected and this, the corruptibility of tax inspectors, makes
58 evasion less attractive. In this way, greater corruptibility of tax inspectors could lead
59 to less evasion. With regard to the effect that a public system of incentives, i.e.
60 bonus rate, may have on tax evasion, it should be noted that, as a growing amount of
61 literature has stressed, incentive schemes can motivate the tax inspectors to carry
62 out more exhaustive controls (Chand and Moene 1999; Das–Guspta and Mookher-
63 jee 1998; Mookherjee 1997). In fact, Chand and Moene (1999) set out a model
64 which shows how bonus payments to tax administrators can reduce corruption; the
65 bonus payments substitute for bribes. A case study from Ghana is used to show how,
66 after a reform in the public service in 1981, ‘‘rampant ﬁscal corruption was brought
67 under control’’, thank to the use of bonus payments which stimulated ﬁscal ofﬁcers
68 to greater honesty1
1FL01 1 For an empirical experiment on the role of public incentives for public ofﬁcial in Punjab, Pakistan, see
1FL02 Khwaja et al. (2012).
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69 In order to analyze this fact, we consider an incentive scheme (public) which
70 guarantees that the tax inspector takes a share of any evaded taxes which are
71 discovered: this reinforces the inspector’s position in negotiating and obtains a
72 higher bribe, reducing the attractiveness of evasion. But we must also consider the
73 interaction between the two incentive mechanisms on tax evasion, in that, as argued
74 by Fjeldstad and Tungodden (2003), the bonus system provides incentives for the
75 corrupt tax inspector. In fact the awareness by the tax inspector that s/he can report
76 tax evasion and be partly rewarded for this, even if the entrepreneur does not agree
77 to pay the bribe, increases the tax inspector’s bargaining strength. Greater
78 bargaining strength on the part of the inspector implies that the entrepreneur ﬁnds
79 it less worthwhile to be an evader and, therefore, corrupt. Thus, the presence of
80 corruptible inspectors strengthens the role of public incentives to combat tax
81 evasion.
82 Therefore, we rely on a world where tax inspectors and entrepreneurs are open to
83 bribery and proceed as follows: ﬁrst, we assume that the State ﬁghts tax evasion
84 through the implementation of incentive schemes for tax inspectors. The economic
85 proﬁtability of such incentives should be in contrast with that of the bribes coming
86 out from a negotiation between inspectors and entrepreneurs, hence corruption;
87 second, we take into account that incentive schemes affect the bargaining strength
88 of tax inspectors in determining bribes.
89 In detail, we construct a bayesian game played by the State, entrepreneurs and tax
90 inspectors and we explore interaction between ﬁscal evasion and corruption. In this
91 context, we analyze the role of a public incentive scheme, considering that the tax
92 inspector’s bargaining strength can be endogenous with respect to an incentive
93 mechanism. In addition, following Fjeldstad and Tungodden (2003), we consider
94 how the corruptibility level of a country can affect the effectiveness of a bonus
95 system.
96 The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we present the model. In Sect. 3, we
97 describe the timing of the game and provide the main results. In Sect. 4, we
98 endogenize the inspector’s bargaining strength considering that it depends on the
99 incentive scheme. Section 5 concludes. All proofs of Propositions are in the
100 Appendix.
101 2 Theoretical model
102 Consider an economy composed of three players: the State, tax inspectors and
103 entrepreneurs. Tax inspectors cannot invest in production activity and earn a ﬁxed
104 salary k. Entrepreneurs work in the production sector. The population of
105 entrepreneurs and tax inspectors is normalized to 1.
106 The State monitors entrepreneurs’ behavior through tax inspectors, in order to
107 weed out or reduce evasion, and ﬁxes the level of the tax rate t. The State also uses
108 its tax revenues to pay the tax inspectors’ wages but there is no space for ﬁnancing
109 public productive expenditure. Moreover, in order to focus more appropriately on
110 the analysis of the incentive schemes, we do not rely on a budget constraint issue.
111 We assume that taxation is not distortive regarding input provision. Nature decides
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112 the amount of entrepreneurs’ production: in particular, an entrepreneur produces an
113 income y - e with probability p and y with probability 1 - p. In the ﬁrst case, the
114 entrepreneur reports the total amount y - e of her/his production, while in the latter
115 case the entrepreneur can decide to underreport her/his income by the amount e, and
116 the evasion can be discovered only if the entrepreneur is checked by a tax
117 inspector2. The tax inspector does not check the entrepreneur if an amount of y is
118 reported, while s/he can check the entrepreneur in presence of a declared production
119 of y - e. The tax inspector must decide whether to check the entrepreneur or not,
120 depending on the cost of the effort of inspection x 2 ð0;þ1Þ, on the bribe that the
121 tax inspector can obtain from the tax evader and on the bonus rate a 2 ð0; 1Þ that
122 s/he can obtain on any evasion s/he reports. We assume that x\ et i.e. the evaded
123 amount is higher than the cost of inspection, as it naturally should be. The tax
124 inspector who discovers evasion decides whether to report it or to ask for a bribe:
125 indeed, it is common knowledge that the tax inspector is corruptible and open to
126 bribery, in the sense that s/he pursues her/his own interest and not necessarily that of
127 the State.
128 Let bd be the bribe requested by the tax inspector. Then, in the case in which the
129 agreement is not reached, the tax inspector reports the tax evader, the latter incurs a
130 punishment (either monetary, moral or criminal). We assume that the entrepreneurs are
131 not homogeneous agents and they incur different ‘‘moral costs’’ when they are reported
132 for being evader3. More precisely, it is common knowledge that the j-th entrepreneur
133 incurs a speciﬁc value cj to the ‘‘moral costs’’ derived from being caught in evasion (see
134 Cerqueti and Coppier 2009; Cerqueti et al. 2011). If reported, the entrepreneur does not
135 pay the bribe but must pay taxes ty, and suffers the ‘‘moral costs’’ cj.
136 3 The game: description and solution
137 Given the framework described above, we can formalize the economic problem into
138 a ﬁve-period game with incomplete information.
139 As already stated in the previous section, the game works as follows: in the ﬁrst
140 stage, Nature decides the entrepreneur’s income: y with probability 1 - p and
141 y - e with probability p; in the second stage, the entrepreneur declares the amount
142 of income; in the third stage, the tax inspector decides whether to check the
2FL01 2 It is worth noticing that the tax inspector do not have information about the entrepreneur before the
2FL02 check. Spciﬁcally, the inspector does not know which entrepreneurs to control until a superior tells her/
2FL03 him the assigned tasks, and s/he cannot refuse to control the entrepreneurs which have been allocated.
3FL01 3 In a micro perspective, the concept of ‘‘moral costs’’ has be used to describe one of the factor which can
3FL02 induce economic agents to engage in corrupt activities. Following Becker (1968): ‘‘A person commits an
3FL03 offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other resources
3FL04 at other activities. Some persons become ‘criminals’, therefore, not because their basic motivation differs
3FL05 from that of other persons, but because their beneﬁts and costs differ’’. More recently, Harstad and
3FL06 Svensson (2011) consider the individual stigma associated with being penalized for corruption
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148 entrepreneur’s declaration or not; in the fourth stage the tax inspector decides
149 whether to ask for a bribe or not, if a false declaration is detected; in the ﬁfth stage,
150 the entrepreneur must take the decision of whether to pay the bribe or not.
151 For a clear exposition, we present the game by distinguishing the cases of high or
152 low income. The payoff vector will be indicated with a triple
p ¼ ðpE; pS; pIÞ; ð1Þ
154 where pE, pS and pI represent the payoffs of the j-th entrepreneur, the State4 and the
155 tax inspector, respectively.
156 The stepwise scheme of the game is the following:
157 First stage
158 Nature decides the amount of the entrepreneur’s production. In particular, the
159 entrepreneur produces an amount y - e with probability p and y with probability
160 1 - p.
161 3.1 Bad state of the Nature: income y - e
162 The entrepreneur produces y - e.
163 Second stage
164 The entrepreneur declares y - e.
165 Third stage
166 The tax inspector must decide whether to check the declared income or not. The
167 game ends in both cases. The payoffs are:
p2 ¼ ðð1 tÞðy eÞ; tðy eÞ; kÞ; if not check;
p4 ¼ ðð1 tÞðy eÞ; tðy eÞ; k xÞ; if check.

ð2Þ
169
170 3.2 Good state of the Nature: income y
171 The entrepreneur produces y.
172 Second stage
173 The entrepreneur must decide the amount of income to declare: y or y - e. If the
174 entrepreneur decides to be honest and declare y, then the tax inspector does not
175 check the entrepreneur’s production and the game ends with the following payoff
176 vector:
p1 ¼ ðð1 tÞy; ty; kÞ: ð3Þ
178 Otherwise, the game continues to stage three.
179 Third stage
4FL01 4 Naturally, the payoff of the State should be understood as the income from taxes paid by the j-th
4FL02 entrepreneur net of the bonus share paid to the inspector.
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180 If the entrepreneur declares y - e, then the tax inspector must decide whether to
181 check the entrepreneur’s production or not. If the tax inspector does not check the
182 entrepreneur’s production, then the entrepreneur pays only the taxes on declared
183 income (y - e). The tax revenues for the State are (y - e)t and the tax inspector
184 receives his wage k. The game ends with following payoff vector:
p3 ¼ ðy ðy eÞt; tðy eÞ; kÞ: ð4Þ
186 Otherwise, the game continues to stage four.
187 Fourth stage
188 The tax inspector checks the entrepreneur’s production and must decide whether
189 to report the evasion or to ask for a bribe bd. If the tax inspector reports the evasion,
190 then the entrepreneur must pay the taxes on all income y and, in addition, s/he incurs
191 a ‘‘moral costs’’ cj; the State receives the taxes ty, but must pay the bonus share a on
192 the reported evasion et; ﬁnally, the tax inspector obtains her/his wage, minus x, plus
193 the bonus share a et. The game ends with the following payoff vector:
p5 ¼ ðð1 tÞy cj; ty aet; k xþ aetÞ: ð5Þ
195 Otherwise, the game continues to stage ﬁve.
196 Fifth stage
197 The tax inspector asks the entrepreneur for a bribe bd[ 0. If the agreement is not
198 achieved, the tax inspector reports the entrepreneur. There is no penalty for the tax
199 inspector, and the game ends with the following payoff vector:
p6 ¼ ðð1 tÞy cj; ty aet; k xþ aetÞ: ð6Þ
201 Otherwise the negotiation starts, and the two parties will ﬁnd the bribe bNB corre-
202 sponding to the Nash solution to a bargaining game, and the game ends. This bribe
203 is the outcome of a negotiation between the inspector and the entrepreneur, who will
204 be assumed to share a given surplus. The entrepreneur pays the bribe and is not
205 reported. The game ends with the payoff vector given by:
p7 ¼ ðy ðy eÞt  b
NB
; tðy eÞ; k xþ bNBÞ: ð7Þ
207 In order to proceed to the solution of the game, we ﬁrstly provide an explicit
208 expression of the bribe bNB.
209 Proposition 3.1 There is a unique bribe bNB, as the Nash solution to the
210 bargaining game, given by:
bNB ¼ aet þ l½cj þ etð1 aÞ: ð8Þ
212 where l 

þb is the share of the surplus that goes to the tax inspector, and  and b
213 are parameters that can be interpreted as measures of bargaining strength of the tax
214 inspector and the entrepreneur respectively.
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215 The game with incomplete information has been solved using the backward
216 induction method starting from the last stage of the game. Its solution is formalized
217 by the following proposition.
218 Proposition 3.2 There exist two thresholds for the ‘‘moral costs’’ n1; n2 2
219 ð0;þ1Þ and a threshold for the probability p1 2 ð0; 1Þ such that
220 (a) If 1 - p[ p1, then:
221 (a.1) if cj B n1, the game ends with random payoff vector
pA ¼
p3 with probability 1 p;
p2 with probability p;

2234 (a.2) if n1\ cj B n2, the game ends with random payoff vector
pB ¼
p7 with probability 1 p;
p4 with probability p;

2267 (a.3) if cj[ n2, the game ends with random payoff vector
pC ¼
p1 with probability 1 p;
p4 with probability p;

229
230 (b) If 1 - p B p1, then:
231 (b.1) if cj B n1, the game ends with payoff vector pA:
232 (b.2) if cj[ n1, the game ends with payoff vector pC:
233 The previous proposition shows that we obtain different perfect Nash equilibria
234 in the sub-games, depending on the parameter values. The distinction between the
235 good and the bad state of Nature is needed.
236 If the income of the entrepreneur is y - e, two equilibria without evasion occur:
237 • p2 is associated to the equilibrium with no check.
238 • p4 is associated to the equilibrium with check.
239 When the income of the entrepreneur is y, then three equilibria occur:
240 • p1 is associated to the equilibrium with no evasion.
241 • p3 is associated to the equilibrium with undetected evasion;
242 • p7 is associated to the equilibrium with evasion and corruption.
243 The case of the good state of Nature is the one allowing corruption and evasion.
244 Therefore, even if the game is solved by taking into account both the states of
245 Nature, we will focus our discussion on the case in which the income of the
246 entrepreneur is y, i.e. on equilibria p1; p3 and p7:
247 In order to give greater insight to the presentation of the results, let us rename the
248 thresholds found for the ‘‘moral costs’’:
249 • n1. We call this threshold the inspector monitoring threshold (IMT) because if
250 the ‘‘moral costs’’ are less than n1, the tax inspector will ﬁnd it worthwhile not to
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251 carry out any checks on the entrepreneur; if the ‘‘moral costs’’ are greater than
252 n1, the tax inspector will ﬁnd it worthwhile to carry out checks on the
253 entrepreneur;
254 • n2. We call this threshold the EET because if the j-th entrepreneur has ‘‘moral
255 costs’’ greater than n2, the entrepreneur will ﬁnd it worthwhile to be honest; the
256 j-th entrepreneur with ‘‘moral costs’’ less than n2 will ﬁnd it worthwhile to
257 evade.
258 The equilibria achieved depend, in almost all cases, on the probability of
259 occurrence of a state of Nature. In fact a high probability p (1 - p B p1) implies
260 that there is high probability that bad states of Nature, i.e. with low production, will
261 occur and, therefore, in this case, the inspector will consider it more plausible if
262 income equal to y - e is reported. To make a more intuitive representation of
263 results, we call the cases in which 1 - p[ p1 ‘‘Expansion’’ and those in which
264 1 - p B p1 ‘‘Recession’’.
265 In particular:
266 (a) ‘‘Expansion’’. In this circumstance, there is a low likelihood of adverse states
267 of Nature (production equal to y - e).
268 (a.1) Equilibrium with undetected evasion applies. As the ‘‘moral costs’’ of
269 the j-th entrepreneur are less than the IMT, the inspector will ﬁnd that it
270 is not worthwhile to carry out checks on the entrepreneur, for the simple
271 reason that the effort of inspecting is not compensated by the small
272 amount of the bribe. Simultaneously, the entrepreneur will ﬁnd it
273 worthwhile to underreport her/his income, because the ‘‘moral costs’’
274 are low.
275 (a.2) Equilibrium with evasion and corruption applies. Under these
276 parameter conditions, the entrepreneur will ﬁnd it worthwhile to
277 underreport her/his income, since the ‘‘moral costs’’ are smaller than
278 the EET. Now the ‘‘moral costs’’ are higher than the IMT, and the
279 possible bribe is quite large. Moreover, there is a high probability that
280 the low production declared is not the real entrepreneur’s income, in
281 that the expansion case is actually occurring. Therefore, the tax
282 inspector ﬁnds it worthwhile to check the entrepreneur’s production.
283 The negotiated bribe is so small for the entrepreneur, that the detected
284 evader prefers to agree to it rather than being reported.
285 (a.3) Equilibrium without evasion applies. Following the arguments of the
286 previous case, the inspector checks the entrepreneur’s production.
287 Furthermore, since the ‘‘moral costs’’ are higher than the EET, the
288 payoff that the entrepreneur can get by evading (with corruption) is
289 lower than that which would be obtained by declaring all her/his
290 income. In this case, then the entrepreneur will be honest and will
291 report all income.
292 (b) ‘‘Recession’’. In this case, a high probability p (1 - p B p1) implies that there
293 is a high probability that bad states of Nature, i.e. with low production (y - e),
294 will occur.
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295 (b.1) Equilibrium with undetected evasion applies. The ‘‘moral costs’’ of
296 the j-th entrepreneur are less than the IMT. Hence, the inspector will
297 ﬁnd that it is not worthwhile to check entrepreneur’s production, for
298 two reasons: ﬁrstly, the effort of inspecting is greater than the
299 equilibrium bribe; secondly, there is a high probability that the low
300 production declared is the entrepreneur’s real income. At the same
301 time, the entrepreneur underreports her/his income, because the ‘‘moral
302 costs’’ are low.
303 (b.2) Equilibrium without evasion applies. The monitoring activity takes
304 place, because the ‘‘moral costs’’ are higher than the IMT, and then the
305 possible bribe is of a large amount. Furthermore, since the ‘‘moral
306 costs’’ are higher than the EET, then the same arguments developed in
307 (a.3) apply, and the entrepreneur will be honest.
308 The State, in order to reduce evasion and corruption, can use different tools. It is
309 important to note that tax evasion can be reduced through greater control by the
310 inspectors and greater social stigma associated with corruption, i .e. the corrupt-
311 ibility level of entrepreneurs. The probability of being controlled by an inspector is
312 endogenous and depends on economic factors such as incentive schemes, bargaining
313 power of the inspector and tax rate. With regard to the effect that a public system of
314 incentives, i.e. bonus rate, may have on tax evasion, we will demonstrate in the next
315 paragraph, that incentive schemes can motivate the tax inspectors to carry out more
316 exhaustive controls. In addition we will consider the link between incentive
317 schemes and bargaining power of the tax inspector. Therefore, here we perform a
318 sensitivity analysis on the role of tax rate on the level of honesty. As we said, we
319 found two thresholds n1 and n2. We called n1 the IMT because if the ‘‘moral costs’’
320 are less than n1, the tax inspector will ﬁnd it worthwhile not to carry out any checks
321 on the entrepreneur; if the ‘‘moral costs’’ are greater than n1, then the tax inspector
322 will ﬁnd it worthwhile to carry out checks on the entrepreneur. The threshold n2 will
323 be denoted hereafter as the EET because if the j-th entrepreneur has ‘‘moral costs’’
324 greater than n2, the entrepreneur will ﬁnd it worthwhile to be honest, while the j-th
325 entrepreneur with ‘‘moral costs’’ less than n2 will ﬁnd it worthwhile to evade. n1 is
326 the relevant threshold in the ‘‘Recession’’ case:
on1
ot
¼ 
1
l
ae ð1 aÞe\0 ð9Þ
328 Therefore, as the tax rate increases, the economic incentive for the tax inspector to
329 control increases as well, in that n1 decreases. This greater control induces entre-
330 preneurs to be more honest.
331 Viceversa, n2 is the relevant threshold in the ‘‘Expansion’’ case:
on2
ot
¼
ð1 lÞeð1 aÞ
l
[ 0 ð10Þ
333 Therefore, as the tax rate increases, the economic incentive for the entrepreneur to
334 evade increases as well, in that n2 grows. This leads to a reduction of the entre-
335 preneur’s honesty.
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336 Thus, the tax rate has a twofold effect. If the economy is in ‘‘Recession’’ case,
337 then the monitoring activity level of inspectors is low and, therefore, an increase of
338 the tax rate, which increases control, promotes entrepreneur’s honesty. Viceversa, in
339 the ‘‘Expansion’’ case, the incentive to evading and bribing increases as the tax rate
340 grows. In fact, when the tax rate increases, then the growth of the surplus deriving
341 from evasion compensates largely the greater control of the inspector. This opens up
342 spaces for evasion and corruption.
343 With regard to corruptibility level of entrepreneurs, the State, in order to reduce
344 evasion, could increase the social stigma due to being detected in a corrupt
345 transaction5. In this case, the greater ‘‘moral costs’’ reduce, at aggregate level, the
346 number of entrepreneurs corrupted, i.e. with speciﬁc ‘‘moral costs’’ cj[ n2.
347 4 The role of incentives in fighting evasion
348 The presence of an incentive scheme for tax inspectors reduces the occurrence of
349 tax evasion, as evidence suggests. A formal proof of this fact can be derived directly
350 from the solution of the game in Proposition 3.2. Such a case is associated to the
351 following conditions:
1 p[ p1; cj[ n2;
1 p p1; cj[ n1:

ð11Þ
353 The measure of the interval [n2, 1] (case of expansion) or [n1, 1] (case of recession)
354 can be viewed as a proxy of the honesty level of the society. In particular, the level
355 of honesty of the Country grows as the measure of such an interval increases.
356 If n2 C 1 (case of expansion) or n1 C 1 (case of recession), then Proposition 3.2
357 assures that the equilibrium with no evasion does not occur.
358 The idea that supports the analysis in this section, as already stated, is that not
359 only the introduction of a public bonus certainly make evasion less attractive for the
360 tax inspector, but also the bonus system interacts with the corruptibility of tax
361 inspectors. To be more precise, the bonus rate for the tax inspector makes her/him
362 stronger in her/his negotiation with the taxpayer and, as a result, when corruption
363 takes place, s/he receives a larger part of the pie for not reporting the evasion to the
364 tax authorities (see Fjeldstad and Tugodden 2003). In light of this consideration, we
365 would like to point out the interaction between bonus share and corruptibility,
366 endogenyzing the bargaining power of the tax inspector l with respect to the bonus
367 rate a. In particular, we model the hypothesis that, as the bonus rate grows the
368 bargaining strength of the tax inspector also grows and, consequently, the
369 bargaining power of the taxpayer decreases. This simple analysis allows us to
370 highlight the increased effectiveness of the public system of incentives in the
5FL01 5 However, it is poorly understood what exactly, on the micro-level, the determinants of corruptibility are
5FL02 and what institutional arrangements could be used to ﬁght (the causes of) corruption. For an experiment
5FL03 see e.g. Dusek et al. (2005): their results suggest strongly that the extent of corruption in a society is a
5FL04 major determinant of corruptibility. The related but preliminary results conﬁrm this result and suggest that
5FL05 inequality aversion is an additional determinant.
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371 presence of widespread corruptibility. In order to do this, we analyze how incentives
372 a inﬂuence the honesty level of the Country in two situations:
373 • the parameter a does not affect the other terms of the model. This will be
374 denoted as the simple case;
375 • the parameter a inﬂuences the bargaining strength of the inspector. In this case,
376 we consider the interaction between the bonus rate and the bargaining strength
377 of tax inspector: to be more precise, greater a means greater l. This will be
378 denoted as the complex case.
379 While the analysis in the former case is straightforward and we report it only for
380 comparison purposes, in the latter we have a further effect of the incentive
381 parameter on the honesty level through the bargaining parameter l.
382 4.1 Simple case
383 The relationship between the honesty level of the society and the bonus rate a is
384 formalized in the following result.
385 Proposition 4.1 Assume that 1 - p[ p1. There exists a1 2 R such that:
386 • a B a1 is equivalent to n2 C 1, and the equilibrium with no-evasion vanishes;
387 • a[a1 if and only if 1 - n2 increases with respect to a.
388 Assume that 1 - p B p1. There exists a2; a3 2 R such that:
389 • a B a2 is equivalent to n1 C 1, and the equilibrium with no-evasion disappears;
390 • a 2 ða2; a3Þ if and only if 1 - n1 increases with respect to a;
391 • a C a3 equals to n1 B 0, and the game ends always in the equilibrium with no-
392 evasion.
393 4.2 Complex case
394 In this case, the bargaining power of the tax inspector l is assumed to be positively
395 related to the bonus rate a. To model this behaviour, we assume the existence of a
396 number s 2 ð0; 1Þ such that l = s a. The thresholds n1 and n2 become:
n1 ¼
1
sa

x
1 p
 aet
 
þ ða 1Þet; ð12Þ
398
n2 ¼
etð1 saÞð1 aÞ
sa
: ð13Þ
399400 The following result summarizes how the honesty level of the society depends on
401 the bonus rate.
402 Proposition 4.2 Assume that 1 - p[ p1. There exists a4 2 ð0; 1Þ such that:
403 • a B a4 is equivalent to n2 C 1, and the equilibrium with no-evasion disappears;
404 • a[a5 if and only if 1 - n2 increases with respect to a.
405 Assume that 1 - p B p1. There exists a5 2 ð0; 1Þ such that:
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406 • a C a5 is equivalent to n1 C 1, and the equilibrium with no-evasion disappears;
407 • a\a5 if and only if 1 - n1 increases with respect to a.
408 Tables 1 and 2 sum up the relationship between honesty level and bonus rate in
409 simple and complex cases, respectively.
410 4.3 Comparison between the cases
411 A comparison between the simple case and the complex one is now needed. We
412 start from the evidence, already stressed above, that the measure of honesty level is
413 given by 1 - n2 (case of expansion) or 1 - n1 (case of recession). Propositions 4.1
414 and 4.2 assure that the honesty level grows as the entity of the bonus rate increases,
415 in the whole set of cases and in recession as well as in expansion. We here want to
416 discuss how such a growth takes place, i.e. we want to emphasize the effectiveness
417 of the instrument of public incentives when we are in the presence of corruptible
418 inspectors. More speciﬁcally, we perform a comparison between the rates of growth
419 in the simple and complex cases.
420 The following result summarizes our ﬁndings.
421 Proposition 4.3 Assume that 1 - p[ p1. Deﬁne:
fSðaÞ ¼
o
oa
ð1 n2Þ; n2 as in ð24Þ;
fCðaÞ ¼
o
oa
ð1 n2Þ; n2 as in ð13Þ:
423 We have: fC(a) - fS(a)[ 0 if and only if l[ s a
2.
424 Now, assume 1 - p B p1. Deﬁne:
gSðaÞ ¼
o
oa
ð1 n1Þ; n1 as in ð19Þ;
gCðaÞ ¼
o
oa
ð1 n1Þ; n1 as in ð12Þ:
426 We have: gC(a) - gS(a)[ 0 if and only if l[ sa
2  1p
p1
:
427 It is worth noting that l = s a implies that the conditions on l in the ﬁrst and in
428 the second part of the enunciation are trivially true. Indeed:
429 • l = s a[ s a2, being a 2 ð0; 1Þ;
Table 1 Simple case
Expansion
Low bonus rate Minimum level of honesty
High bonusrate Increasing level of honesty
Recession
Low bonus rate Minimum level of honesty
Mediumbonus rate Increasing level of honesty
High bonus rate Maximum level of honesty
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430 • l ¼ sa[ sa
2  1p
p1
; being a 2 ð0; 1Þ and 1 - p B p1.
431 Hence, the rate of growth of the honesty level with respect to the bonus rate a is
432 higher in the complex case than in the simple one, in both cases of recession or
433 expansion and for each level of a 2 ð0; 1Þ: This result was rather expected: indeed,
434 as already discussed above, the action of the parameter a on the honesty level is
435 stronger in the complex case than in the simple one. In fact, when considering not
436 only the effect of the two incentive schemes (private and public) individually, but
437 also their interaction, we obtain the result that an environment in which inspectors
438 are highly corruptible, the introduction or strengthening of an incentive system is
439 more effective.
440 5 Conclusions
441 This work develops a theoretical model for analyzing the role of incentive schemes
442 where there is ﬁscal corruption, i.e. in a world where tax inspectors are open to
443 bribery. We consider that two types of incentives for the reduction of evasion can
444 exist: a legal, public incentive scheme which implies that the tax inspector takes a
445 share of any discovered evaded taxes; an illegal private incentive represented by a
446 bribe which the tax inspector can ask from the entrepreneur caught evading. We
447 analyze not only the effects which these two incentives can have on evasion, but
448 also the effect which derives from the interaction between these two different
449 incentives.
450 In details, we develop a bayesian game played by the State, entrepreneurs and tax
451 inspectors and we explore interaction between ﬁscal evasion and corruption. The
452 possibility of negotiating bribes with tax evaders (corruption) pushes the inspectors
453 to carry out more checks. If this is anticipated by the taxpayers, the potential
454 corruption makes tax evasion less attractive because it increases the likelihood of
455 detection. In this way, greater corruptibility of tax inspectors could lead to less
456 evasion and higher tax revenues. Furthermore, we analyze the role of a public
457 incentive scheme, considering that the tax inspector’s bargaining strength is
458 endogenous with respect to an incentive mechanism: indeed the knowledge that
459 even if the entrepreneur does not agree to pay the bribe, the tax inspector can report
460 tax evasion and be partly rewarded for this, increases the tax inspector’s bargaining
461 strength. We take into account that entrepreneurs have different degrees of
462 corruptibility: in fact we assume that the entrepreneurs incur different ‘‘moral costs’’
Table 2 Complex case
Expansion
Low bonus rate Minimum level of honesty
High bonusrate Increasing level of honesty
Recession
Low bonus rate Minimum level of honesty
High bonusrate Increasing level of honesty
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463 when they are reported for evasion. More precisely, the j-th entrepreneur suffers a
464 moral damage of value cj due to the objective punishment when the evasion is
465 detected, and this assumption can modify the implications of a bonus system. Our
466 model provides guidance on the relationship between the integrity of a country, the
467 bonus rate for tax inspectors and evasion. To be more precise, we demonstrate that,
468 in countries with high inner honesty there is no evasion, regardless of incentive
469 schemes. In countries with inner honesty in the middle range, in expansion, there is
470 evasion and corruption is not detected. Conversely, in countries with low inner
471 honesty, we must distinguish between favorable or unfavorable economic situations.
472 Indeed, in an economy in recession, there is only undetected evasion because, in this
473 case, it is very plausible that the low income reported by the entrepreneurs is
474 grounded on a negative economic situation rather than evasion. Then the tax
475 inspectors, with low incentives (and bargaining power), will not make checks and
476 thus, the entrepreneurs will ﬁnd it worthwhile to evade. In contrast, in an economy
477 in expansion, the inspector does not have necessary incentives to check the
478 entrepreneur.
479 Regarding the interaction between the tax inspector’s corruptibility and public
480 incentive schemes, we show that the presence of widespread corruptibility
481 reinforces the effectiveness of government incentives. In fact, the presence of a
482 system of bonus shares for the inspectors strengthens their position in negotiating
483 the bribe, making corruption, and therefore tax evasion, less attractive. This simple
484 model, therefore, offers an easy policy: the instrument of incentives paid to the
485 inspectors is more effective and therefore, more desirable in the ﬁght against tax
486 evasion in a highly corrupt environment.
487 Appendix
488 Proof of Proposition 3.1
489 Let /D ¼ /
ðEÞ
D ;/
ðIÞ
D be the vector of the differences in the payoffs between the case
490 of agreement and disagreement regarding the bribe between the entrepreneur and
491 the tax inspector. In accordance with generalized Nash bargaining theory, the
492 division between two agents will solve:
max
b2Rþ
½/
ðEÞ
D 
b  ½/
ðIÞ
D 
 ð14Þ
494 in formula
max
b2Rþ
et  bþ cj
 b
b aet½  ð15Þ
496 which is the maximum of the product between the elements of /D: The parameters b
497 and  can be interpreted as measures of bargaining strength of the entrepreneur and
498 tax inspector, respectively.
499 The ﬁrst order condition gives:
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et  bþ cj
 b1
b aet½ 1 b b aet½  þ  et  bþ cj
  
¼ 0;
501 which leads to an asymmetric (or generalized) Nash bargaining solution, which is
502 the unique equilibrium bribe bNB in the last subgame:
bNB ¼ aet þ l½cj þ etð1 aÞ: ð16Þ
504 The parameter l ¼

þb reﬂects the distribution of bargaining strength between the
505 two agents.
506 Proof of Proposition 3.2
507 The static game is solved using backward induction, which enables the equilibria to
508 be obtained.
509 (5) At stage ﬁve, the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe if, and only if,
DEA ¼ p
E
7  p
E
6 [ 0;
511 that is: if the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe her/his payoff is greater than her/his
512 payoff if s/he refuses. Such a condition is equivalent to
cj[ etða 1Þ;
514 that is always satisﬁed. Hence, s/he will ﬁnd it worthwhile to negotiate the bribe.
515 (4) Ascending the decision-making tree, at stage four the tax inspector decides
516 whether or not to ask for a bribe. The tax inspector knows that if s/he asks for a
517 bribe then the entrepreneur will start a negotiation and the ﬁnal bribe will be
518 bNB. Then, at stage four the tax inspector asks for a bribe if and only if the tax
519 inspector’s payoff on asking for a bribe is greater than the payoff if s/he
520 doesn’t, i.e. if
DIB ¼ p
I
7  p
I
5[ 0:
522 Such a condition is equivalent to
cj[ ða 1Þet;
524 that is always true. Hence, the tax inspector will ask for a bribe.
525 (3) At stage three, the tax inspector must decide whether to inspect the
526 entrepreneur or not: the tax inspector checks the entrepreneur’s behavior if
527 and only if the tax inspector’s expected payoff on checking the evader is
528 greater than her/his expected payoff if s/he doesn’t. Denote as pC
(I) and pNC
(I) the
529 random variables associated to the payoff of the tax inspector when checking
530 or not checking the entrepreneur, respectively. We introduce the expected
531 value operator as E. We need to analyze
D
ðIÞ
C ¼ E½p
ðIÞ
C   E½p
ðIÞ
NC:
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534 We have
E½p
ðIÞ
NC ¼ pkþ kð1 pÞ ¼ k: ð17Þ
536 When checking, the tax inspector will ask for a bribe and such a bribe will be
537 negotiated by the entrepreneur. Therefore, the expected payoff of the tax inspector
538 when checking is:
E½p
ðIÞ
C  ¼ pðk xÞ þ ð1 pÞfk xþ aet þ l½cj þ etð1 aÞg: ð18Þ
540 Therefore
D
ðIÞ
C ¼ xþ ð1 pÞfaet þ l½cj þ etð1 aÞg[ 0
542 if and only if
cj[ n1 ¼
1
l

x
1 p
 aet
 
þ ða 1Þet; ð19Þ
544 so that:
545 (3.1) if cj[ n1, the tax inspector checks the entrepreneur’s production;
546 (3.2) if cj B n1, the tax inspector does not check the entrepreneur’s
547 production.
548 (2) At stage two the entrepreneur must decide whether to underreport her/his
549 income. The case with production y - e is trivial. If the income is y, the
550 decision is driven by the payoffs. Denote as pR
(E) and pNR
(E) the payoff of
551 the entrepreneur when reporting y or y - e, respectively. In this case, the
552 entrepreneur reports her/his income if and only if
D
ðEÞ
R ¼ p
ðEÞ
R  p
ðEÞ
NR [ 0:
554 We can write
p
ðEÞ
R ¼ ð1 tÞy: ð20Þ
556 The payoff of the entrepreneur when underreporting depends on the value of cj.
557 (2.1) If cj B n1, then the tax inspector does not check the entrepreneur’s
558 production. In this case:
p
ðEÞ
NR ¼ y tðy eÞ; ð21Þ
560 and we have
D
ðEÞ
R ¼ et\0:
562 The game ends with random payoff
p3 with probability 1 p;
p2 with probability p:

ð22Þ
564
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565 (2.2) If cj[ n1, then the tax inspector ﬁnds it worthwhile to check the
566 entrepreneur. Moreover, in this case the bribe bNB is required by the tax
567 inspector and accepted by the entrepreneur.
p
ðEÞ
NR ¼ y ðy eÞt  aet  lðcj þ etð1 aÞÞ: ð23Þ
569 Thus we have
D
ðEÞ
R ¼ lcj  etð1 aÞð1 lÞ[ 0
571 if and only if
cj[ n2 ¼
etð1 lÞð1 aÞ
l
: ð24Þ
573 Some cases can be distinguished.
574 (2.2.1) If cj[ n2, and the entrepreneur decides to report y. The game
575 ends with random payoff
p1 with probability 1 p;
p4 with probability p:
ð25Þ
5778 (2.2.2) If cj B n2, then the entrepreneur decides to report y - e. The
579 game ends with random payoff
p7 with probability 1 p;
p4 with probability p:

ð26Þ
581
582 To complete the proof, deﬁne
p1 ¼
x
et
:
584 Some straightforward computations give:
1 p p1 ) n2 n1;
1 p p1 ) n2 n1:

ð27Þ
586587 Proof of Proposition 4.1
588 The proof is trivial. The critical values of a are:
a1 ¼ 1
l
ð1 lÞet
; a2 ¼
x
1p lð1þ etÞ
ð1 lÞet
; a3 ¼
x
1p let
ð1 lÞet
:
590591 Proof of Proposition 4.2
592 Some tedious and straightforward algebraic manipulations give that:
593 • if 1 - p[ p1, then n2 2 ð0; 1Þ if and only if
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a[ a4 ¼
etð1þ sÞ þ s
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
½etð1þ sÞ þ s2  4ðetÞ2s
q
2ets
;
595 where a4 2 ð0; 1Þ;
596 • if 1 - p B p1, then n1 2 ð0; 1Þ if and only if
a\a5 ¼
etð1þ sÞ þ s
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
½etð1þ sÞ þ s2  4etsx
1p
q
2ets
;
598 where a5 2 ð0; 1Þ.
599 Tho complete the proof, it is sufﬁcient to observe that
oð1 n2Þ
oa
¼
etð1 sa2Þ
sa2
[ 0; 8a 2 ða4; 1
601 and
oð1 n1Þ
oa
¼
x
1p etsa
2
sa2
[ 0; 8a 2 ½0; a5Þ:
603604 Proof of Proposition 4.3
605 The result states immediately, by observing that
fSðaÞ ¼
etð1 lÞ
l
; fCðaÞ ¼
etð1 sa2Þ
sa2
607 and
gSðaÞ ¼
etð1 lÞ
l
; gCðaÞ ¼
x
1p etsa
2
sa2
:
609
610
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